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THE COST OF JUSTICE: AN AMERICAN PROBLEM,
AN ENGLISH SOLUTION
HOWARD GREENBERGER'
"E VERYBODY'S DOING IT" - that old refrain that remains
the bane of parents is particularly apropos of the reform of
adjective law. The literature of judicial administration has grown
apace in the past decade signaling the ferment for procedural reform
that is sweeping the nation. Amidst the welter of new studies and
proposals, it is interesting to note that little, if anything, has appeared
concerning English procedure.'
This past half-century has witnessed substantial procedural reform
in almost every American jurisdiction. Despite these often herculean
efforts, the nationwide picture remains anything but encouraging.2
At best, our efforts at the elimination of intolerable court congestion
have produced a breakthrough here, a relapse there. Prescription after
prescription has failed to cure the fever and, in our frantic desire to
preserve our judicial institutions, we have called for more judges,
more courtrooms, and more effective pretrial procedure. Even less
commendable nostrums and gimmicks have been advocated and
attempted; however, the treadmill appears to frustrate our best efforts
to such an extent that respected members of the profession have more
and more frequently been heard to advocate fundamental changes.
Initially, the threat of an administrative workmen's compensation
approach to personal injury litigation may have been intended as a
spur to reform. As frustration increased, the threat became more
palatable to many and is now proposed as a solution of merit.3
In the face of what many at the bar would feel to be an ominous
departure from basic judicial concepts, the time has arrived when
the English solution to this vexing problem of procedure be seriously
considered. Such a study appears particularly justified as there are no
judicial roadblocks in England such as exist in almost every American
urban center. In the face of this fact it is noteworthy that their
judicial manpower has remained comparatively stable for ninety years,
t B.S., 1951, University of Pittsburgh; LL.B., 1954, New York University;
Associate Professor of Law, New York University.
1. KARLEN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATXS AND ENGLAND (1963).
2. INSTITUTE O9 JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STATE TRIAL COURTS or GENERAL
JURISDICTION - CALENDAR STATUS STUDY - 1963.
3. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1963, p. 35, col. 4.
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THE COST OF JUSTICE
despite the fact that the total population of England and Wales has
increased from 22.7 million people to 43.5 million during the period
in question." Obviously, there are a number of factors that contribute to
this "consummation devoutly to be wished." The steady decline in the
number of jury trials has certainly been of major significance; however,
it appears clear that one of the elements contributing to the result is the
costs system and its ancillary effects on judicial administration.
Underlying the costs system as it presently exists in English
jurisprudence is a precept that only receives lip service in the United
States. In England there is general accord on the proposition that
damages should make the injured party whole.' Moreover, if the
tortfeasor or contract breaker refuses to honor the legitimate demands
of the ultimately successful party and forces the latter to resort to
litigation, he is considered to have increased the damages inflicted.
Having done so and necessitated employment of solicitors and bar-
risters, there is every reason to require him to pay for the expenses
his successful adversary has had to incur. It will readily be discerned
that the heaviest expenses arise as a result 'of the employment of
solicitors and barristers,6 although court costs may and often do
subsume a number of other items including court fees, witness fees,
and stenographic charges.7 These generalizations are, of course, sub-
ject to numerous qualifications, some of which will be treated in this
article, but suffice it to say that in the vast majority of cases the
successful party to litigation will receive as part of his damages the
costs incurred in obtaining a successful verdict.'
Obviously such a system is based on a proposition that many, if
not a majority of American lawyers and judges, reject; that is, that
in the majority of legal conflicts the rights are clear. The common
4. The population in millions per Queen's Bench Division Judge has gone from
1.26 to 2.18. INITIAL REPORT OF TH COMMITTF. ON SUPREME COURT PRACTICg AND
PROCEDURE, Cmd. No. 7764, Appendix, C, p. 59.
5. Lord Cranworth stated in Clarke v. Hart, 6 H.L.C. 633, 667, 10 Eng. Rep.
1443, 1457 (1858) : "I think that the general principle upon the subject of costs is,
and ought to be . . . that the costs ought never to be considered as a penalty or
punishment, but merely a necessary consequence of a party having created a litigation
in which he has failed." Quoted with favor in Foster v. Great W. Ry., 8 Q.B.D. 515,
517 (1882).
6. England - solicitor and barrister (or counsel) ; United States - attorney.
7. Costs include all those expenses of litigation which one party has to pay to
the other and must be distinguished from "fees" which have to be paid by each litigant
to the officers of the court. Fees ultimately become part of the bill of costs presented
on taxation and hence some of the resulting confusion. The distinction is important,
for fees normally must be paid to the court prior to any court action, while costs are
taxed and become due only after unsuccessful litigation.
8. Two American jurisdictions have systems remarkably similar to that existent
in England. ALASKA STAT. § 55-11-51 (1962); OR. Rnv. STAT. § 20.010 (1953).
For a more detailed description of the costs systems in the two states, see Green-
berger, Appellate Review in England and the United States - Who Bears the Ultimate
Burden? 1 DuQ. U.L. Rgv. 161 (1963).
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law heritage and its mystique is still rather firmly imbedded in English
jurisprudence and, although exceptions are readily acknowledged and
provided for, the general theory operates on the basis of a law that is
static, settled, and known to the public at large. Once this proposition
is accepted it is not difficult to justify the operation of the costs
system. However, if carried to its dryly logical extreme the system
would verge on the absurd, and to prevent such a result a good measure
of discretion has been vested in the courts to grant exceptions to
the general pattern. 9
For example, the system might be abused by the wealthy litigant
who generates enormous costs in a relatively minor action and
attempts to saddle his opponent with them.'" To avoid such abuse,
objective standards are required." They first appeared nearly a century
ago and have become rather well developed. In its general review
of the procedural system as it existed in 1953, the Supreme Court
Committee on Practice and Procedure (Evershed Committee) recog-
nized three standards as having won general acceptance; 12 namely,
"party and party" taxation, "common fund" taxation, and "solicitor
and own client" taxation.
The normal standard applied by the courts in the vast majority
of cases is party and party taxation.'" On such a taxation the Taxing
Master, who acts in a capacity similar to a Referee in Bankruptcy,
will allow a party to expend a bare minimum in furtherance of his
cause. He need not pursue his cause reasonably, but if he chooses to
do otherwise, he will only be reimbursed for that portion of his costs
which are reasonable, necessary, and proper. For the excess, which
9. Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5,
c. 43, § 50. The bill of costs incurred by the successful party is subjected to a process
of taxation before a Taxing Master, who by Ord. 65, r. 27(29), Supreme Court
Costs Rules, is directed to allow only such costs, charges and expenses as shall appear
to him to have been necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for defending
the rights of any party. It is the duty of the Taxing Master to disallow all costs as
appear to have been incurred or increased through overcaution, negligence, or mistake,
or by payment of special fees to counsel or special charges or expenses to witnesses
or other persons, or by other unusual expenses.
10. Despite the controls exercised by the taxing masters and the courts, the
costs are substantial. In Graigola Merthyr Co., Ltd. v. Swansea Corp., 45 T.L.R.(1920), the unsuccessful plaintiff had to pay more than $350,000. The costs in the
case of Greene v. Levis and British Broadcasting Co. which took up four weeks of
the court's time, were estimated at $85,000 to $110,000. Daily Herald, May 28, 1955,
p. 1, cols. 6-8. The highly publicized case of Champagne Ass'n of Great Britain v.
Costa Brava Wine Co., Ltd., resulted in a cost order of $40,000. Newsweek, Decem-
ber 8, 1958, p. 41.
11. Gibbs v. Gibbs, [1952] 1 All E.R. 942 (P. 1952).
12. COMMITTEE ON SUPREME COURT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT,
Cmd. No. 8878 (1954), § 721 (popularly known as the Evershed Report and herein-
after cited as Ev. REP.).
13. "[O]n a taxation on that basis [i.e., party and party] there shall be allowed
all such costs as were necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for enforcing
or defending the rights of the party whose costs are being taxed." SUPREME COURT
CosTs RULEs 28(2).
[VOL. 9 : p. 400
3
Greenberger: The Cost of Justice: An American Problem, an English Solution
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1964
THE COST OF JUSTICE
might be considered luxuries, he will be on his own.' 4 This has been
the accepted rule ever since 1875, and was most recently reaffirmed
by the Evershed Committee.
Although by no means rare, the common fund standard 5 is
employed less frequently. It was originally termed solicitor and client
taxation and is nothing more than party and party taxation on a
more generous scale.' 6 In taxing costs on a common fund basis, the
Taxing Masters allow fees and charges of increased size as well as
items which would be considered luxuries under the normal taxation.' 7
This standard is applied in situations such as the following:18 (1)
where costs are payable out of a fund owned by the unsuccessful
party, (2) where solicitor and counsel are acting for a party under a
disability, (3) where costs are chargeable to a fund in which both
parties to the litigation have interests, and (4) where one or both of
the parties is legally aided.'"
The distinction between the standards is in great measure one
of emphasis, for in neither instance will the taxing authorities impose
outlandish costs." The most that the eccentric litigant can hope to
achieve is a measure of recovery based upon expenditures that a
litigant spending his own funds might reasonably be expected to have
incurred. On the other hand, the party and party standard sets as its
goal a cost figure based upon a reasonable man doing the litigation
as cheaply as possible inasmuch as another may have to bear the
burden.2' It has been estimated that application of the common fund
standard results in a fifteen percent higher bill, and thus it is eagerly
sought by the successful party.2
The third standard - solicitor and own client taxation - is more
familiar to the American lawyer for it is present in our own juris-
14. Smith v. Buller, L.R. 19 Eq. 473, 475 (1875).
15. The Evershed Committee advocated the substitution of the term "full action
costs" in order to distinguish this concept from the solicitor and own client taxation
with its strikingly dissimilar incidents. Ev. REP. § 720.
16. In the promulgation of the Supreme Court of Judicature Costs Rules, (1959),
effective January 1, 1960, the recommendation of a change of name was accepted,
and the standard entitled "common fund basis of taxation."
"On a taxation on the common fund basis, being a more generous basis than that
provided for by paragraph (2) of this rule [that is, party and party basis], there
shall be allowed a reasonable amount in respect of all costs reasonably incurred,
and paragraph (2) of this rule shall not apply; and accordingly in all cases where
costs are to be taxed on the common fund basis the ordinary rules applicable on a
taxation as between solicitor and client where the costs are to be paid out of a common
fund in which the client and others are interested shall be applied, whether or not the
costs are in fact to be so paid." Id., Rule 4(4).
17. Giles v. Randall, [1915] 1 K.B. 290, 295 (C.A.)
18. Gibbs v. Gibbs, [1952] 1 All E.R. 942 (P. 1952).
19. Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, C. 51, p. 650.
20. Peel v. London & N.W. Rwy. Co. (No. 2), [1907] 1 Ch. 607.
21. Id. at 613.
22. SACHs, LEGAL AID 136 (1951).
SPRING 1964]
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prudence. Putting aside that rather extensive area of practice now
covered by legal aid in England, the general rule is similar to that
existent in the United States; namely, that it is for the lawyer and
his client to determine what fee is to be paid. However, it is recog-
nized in both countries that the client may well be at disadvantage in
negotiating with his attorney or solicitor. The client is likely to be
unaware of the complexities involved in his problem and place undue
reliance on the advice proffered by his solicitor both as to his fee and
that of the barrister. To prevent overreaching by the solicitor, the
taxing masters and the courts employ the solicitor and own client
standard. It normally approaches indemnification except in those
instances in which it is felt that the solicitor has made an exorbitant
or improper charge.23 Although often considered an integral part of
the English system of court costs, it can readily be seen that it is
directed at a completely different problem and has little, if anything,
in common with the other standards - party and party and common
fund taxation.
The system of court costs is operative in the appellate courts as
well as in the trial courts. Thus, an appeal may well result in a new
direction as to costs, for, as a general rule, costs abide the ultimate
result.24 The unsuccessful litigant on appeal will normally find that he
has been ordered to pay his adversary not only the disbursements and
fees incurred in the primary action, but those incurred on the appeal.25
The general pattern, sketchily set forth above, provides the frame-
work for this article which will itself concentrate on the exceptions to
the rules regarding costs. At the outset, it should be noted that the
costs system was not originally intended as a means to effective
judicial administration, nor is it primarily directed to that goal today.
However, it has contributed to the efficiency of the English judicial
system and is undoubtedly destined to continue to do so.
Since the costs of an action include a multitude of charges and
expenses, including attorney's fees, a plaintiff who tarries and dis-
23. "Generally speaking the decision of the Master on taxation is final: he is the
sole judge of the fact, whether the business has been done, and of the proper charge
to be made for it; and it is further his duty to inquire whether the business was
required to be done; for if the solicitor negligently or ignorantly takes any unnecessary
proceedings, it is the duty of the Master to protect the client from any charge in
respect of such proceedings. The court will only interfere where the Master acts upon
some mistaken principle." Alsop v. Lord Oxford, 1 My. & K. 564 (1833), quoted
with favor in Estate of Ogilvie, [1910] 243, 244 (C.A.).
24. "In the case of an appeal the costs of the proceedings giving rise to the appeal,
as well as the costs of the appeal and of the proceedings connected with it, may be
dealt with by the Court hearing the appeal.... .SUPREMZ COURT COSTS RUuSs
1959, 4(2).
25. In re Barangah Oil Refining Co., 36 Ch. D. 702 (1887) ; Ex parte Hauxwell,
23 Ch. D. 626 (1883) ; Chard v. Jervis, 9 Q.B.D. 178 (1881) ; Hussey v. Horne-Payne,
8 Ch. D. 670 (1878).
[VOL. 9 : p. 400
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continues his action on the eve of the trial may well have incurred
quite a substantial amount of the costs expended by his adversary.
When coupled with his own expenditures, the incentive to early
settlement becomes quite apparent. Thus, the very existence of the
costs system encourages settlements, discourages procrastination, and
stimulates speedy, efficient trials.2 6 Much as the effect of taxation on
every business transaction must be considered by the astute lawyer,
so the effect on costs of every contemplated act must be considered
by the solicitor.
The early view as to costs was summed up in a dictum in Foster
v. Great W. Ry.,27 where Lord Justice Cotton quoted with favor
from Clarke v. Hart :2 "I think that the general principle upon the
subject of costs is, and ought to be . . . that the costs ought never to
be considered as a penalty or punishment, but merely as a necessary
consequence of a party having created a litigation in which he has
failed." 29  Even as early as 1882 the viewpoint of the judiciary had
begun to change, and recognition was given to the efficacy of costs
as an instrument of administration. It must be remembered that
Clarke was decided before the Supreme Court of Judicature Act
delegated the extensive discretion to the judges that they now enjoy.
Clearly, the appellate courts have now recognized that costs may be
used for the purpose of doing substantial justice as between the
parties, regulating the flow of cases to various courts and controlling
the actions of parties before the tribunals." Various recommenda-
26. A recent work of fiction about the English bar reported the following colloquy
between a barrister and a judge. The discussion involved a subsidiary item of damage
that was being contested for want of proof of its value.
"What is the item not agreed?"
"A pair of trousers, me Lud. I can't think why my learned friend won't
admit it."
"Let me see," said the judge. "You're claiming 7 10s. They were new,
I suppose?"
"Oh, yes, me Lud."
"You want to fight the pair of trousers, do you, Mr. Ferret?" asked the judge.
"Well, my Lord, no bill has been produced nor have the trousers."
"Well, I hopet'we're not going to spend too much time on them," said thejudge. "If we do, one side or the other would be able to buy a whole suit
with the amount expended in costs."
Cecil, BROTHERS IN LAW 22 (1950).
27. 8 Q.B.D. 515, 517 (1882).
28. 6 H.L.C. 633, 10 Eng. Rep. 1443 (1858).
29. Id. at 667, 10 Eng. Rep. at 1457.
30. Suggestions of this nature were made to the Temporary Commission on the
Courts of the State of New York. The following is pertinent: "Suggestions have
been made that some demands for jury trials would be deterred by the adoption of
higher fees to be paid by the party making the jury demand. Another suggestion is
that provision be made whereby the plaintiff (except where the defendant has refused
to consent to transfer to a lower court) would be liable for the defendant's costs
unless he recovered by judgment at least the maximum jurisdictional amount of the
next lower court. A third suggestion is that a penalty be exacted from a plaintiff
who has unreasonably refused a settlement offer made at a pretrial hearing if he fails
to recover by judgment at the trial an amount at least equal to that offered. Similarly,
SPRING 1964]
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tions of the Evershed Committee's report assume not only the legality,
but also the advisability of such action.
Despite differences in court organization, the organization of the
legal profession, and organized legal assistance between the United
States and England, a number of similar problems have arisen. That
the costs system has been effectively employed by the English to
mitigate these problems appears significant and instructive.
Despite the propensity in all lawyers for procrastination, the
English judicial system is not beset by the intolerable delays that so
many American jurisdictions report.3 ' The very existence of the costs
system discourages delaying tactics and destroys much of their economic
benefit. Rule three of the Supreme Court Costs Rules is specifically
directed to the problem of repeated postponements and adjournments:
The costs of and occasioned by any application to extend the
time fixed by the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, or any direc-
tion or order thereunder, for delivering or filing any document
or doing any other act (including the costs of any order made
on the application) shall be borne by the party making the applica-
tion, unless the Court otherwise orders.3 2
The analogous problem of delaying amendment of pleadings was
considered in the recent case of Anglo-Cyprion Trade Agencies,
Ltd. v. Paphos Wine Indus., Ltd.3 The plaintiffs pleaded that
the wine supplied by the defendants was unsound, unmarketable,
and of inferior quality, and requested the return of the full pur-
chase price of two thousand nine hundred and twenty-eight pounds.
In their answer, the defendant asserted that the taint was so slight
that it could easily be put right, and, therefore, that there was no
breach of contract or at worst a minimal one that could be com-
pensated for by trivial damages. Only after the trial had commenced
did plaintiffs request permission to amend their pleadings to incor-
porate damages based on defendant's answer. Their request was
granted, and it was on that basis that they prevailed, albeit for only
fifty-two pounds. Mr. Justice Devlin, in considering the appropriate
costs order treated the case as one where only nominal damages had been
recovered. The ordinary rule in that instance, he stated, was that
"when plaintiff has been successful, he ought not to be deprived of his
a penalty would be assessed against a defendant who has unreasonably refused to pay
a demand made at a pre-trial hearing where the plaintiff, upon trial, recovers ajudgment in excess of that demand." PRZLIMINARY RZPORT TO THs GOVERNOR AND
LxGiSLATURE 42 (1954).
31. INSTITUTE OP JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STATE TRIAL COURTS OF GENERAL
JURISDICTION - CALENDAR STATUS STUDY - 1963; MFGARRY, LAWYER AND LITIGANT
IN ENGLAND (1962).
32. SUPREME COURT COSTS RULES, 1959, 3(4).
33. [1951] 1 All E.R. 873 (K.B. 1951).
[VOL. 9 : p. 400
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costs, or at any rate, made to pay the costs of the other side, unless
he has been guilty of some sort of misconduct. I do not think that
a plaintiff who recovers nominal damages ought necessarily to be
regarded as a 'successful' plaintiff." 4 Having determined that the
amendment was a necessary one, and not merely technical, he went on
to note that it is customary in such instances for the defendant to
request, and the judge to grant, that any late amendment of pleadings
not affect costs. Thus, "the success on the amendment ought not to
make any difference to the order which I would have made if the
pleadings had stayed as they were originally and judgment had been
entered accordingly";3 that is, for the defendants.
The costs order rendered in Harvey v. Municipal Permanent
Investment Bldg. Soc'y36 was grounded on the same reasoning. The
plaintiff had made, with leave of the court, a major amendment in the
pleadings after the defendant had prevailed in a counterclaim and had
received a costs order in its favor. On appeal, the plaintiff ultimately
received judgment, but the court held that inasmuch as the decision
of the trial court was correct on the pleadings then before it, the costs
order should not be disturbed. Hence, where the court finds a plaintiff
unreasonably delaying a final determination of rights, there is an
effective means of dealing with him. Perhaps even more importantly,
this power acts as an incentive to prospective dawdlers.
Clearly a case of delay in instituting an action, amounting to more
than mere procrastination, is enough cause in equity for denying any
recovery at all on the ground of laches. However, in cases of simple
procrastination where the defendant has been put to no real dis-
advantage by the loss of evidence or the like, the court still has
power to award costs against the party who fails to act with due
diligence. In Bourne v. Swan & Edgar, Ltd., 7 the plaintiff, although
aware of defendant's trademark for over five years, had not moved to
expunge it from the trademark register until the defendant brought an
infringement action against him. Although the court held that the
expunging action would lie, they ordered the plaintiff to pay three-
fifths of the taxed costs of the action. The court stated that "unless
therefore, the action or neglect of the applicants has put the respondent
at some unfair disadvantage, it appears to me that his laches is
sufficiently vitiated by punishment in the way of getting no costs if
he should succeed."3 s Closely related thereto is Costs Rule 3(5) which
34. Id. at 874.
35. Id. at 876.
36. 26 Ch. D. 273 (1884).
37. [1903] 1 Ch. 211.
38. Id. at 219.
SPRING 1964]
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provides that failure to admit documents or facts within a six day
period, when called upon to do so, will result in a costs order for the
expense of proving same against the delaying party.39
The area of appellate procedure is replete with instances in which
the efficacy of costs as an administrative tool has been demonstrated.
On appeal in a 1949 case,40 the four respondents who were all interested
in the residue under a will were represented by three different counsel.
The Master of the Rolls, Lord Greene, stated:
• . . that when appeals are brought to this court and there are
several parties in precisely the same interest with precisely the
same arguments who below may have been separately represented,
it is the duty of the solicitors concerned to do everything possible
to avoid unnecessary costs in this court. In this present case with
a little goodwill and with a desire to avoid multiplication of costs
one set of costs only should have been incurred.4'
Accordingly, the court allowed only one set of costs, these to be shared
among the four respondents.
Just as delay in amendment of pleadings may result in deprivation
of costs, so may delay in formulating one's successful line of argument
on appeal. In Cooper v. Cooper,42 the House of Lords considered the
validity of an ante-nuptial contract made by an infant. The appellant
failed to argue "reduction"43 until she arrived in the House of Lords,
and it was on this point that she ultimately prevailed. The House
agreed with Lord Halsbury that "this may affect the costs; and . . .
ought to affect costs to the extent that . . . the successful appellant
ought not to get the costs of such an appeal which was brought and
successfully argued upon a point not passed upon in the Court below
either by argument or evidence."44 A similar result obtained in Simpson
v. Crowle45 where the appellant first raised a question of jurisdiction
on appeal. The case was finally determined on that issue, and the
appellate court refused costs to the successful appellant inasmuch as
the issue was not raised in the lower court.
Costs have also been denied where the appellant succeeded on
fresh evidence never presented to the lower court.46 If the issue had
39. SUPREME COURT COSTS RULES, 1959, 3(5).
40. In re Gilson, [1949] 1 Ch. 99.
41. Id. at 107.
42. 13 App. Cas. 88 (1888).
43. Reduction - an action for the purpose of setting aside or rendering null and
void some deed, will, right, and so forth. OPP4, WHARTON'S LAw LExlCON 851
(14th ed. 1938).
44. 13 App. Cas. 88, 101 (1888).
45. [1921] 3 K.B. 243.
46. Ex parte Hauxwell, 23 Ch. D. 626 (1883).
[VOL. 9 : p. 400
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been raised, or the evidence proffered, the need for appeal might well
have been obviated.47
The judicial discretion is frequently exercised by the court where
the prevailing party is only partially successful on the appeal. In Port
of London Authority v. Cairn Line,"s the plaintiff prevailed, albeit
only on a minor point, while the defendants raised a number of points
on which they failed. The court indicated that both sides had avoided
trying the real question in dispute between them; accordingly, no
costs were awarded to either side. The decision rendered in William
v. Stanley Jones & Co.,49 was to similar effect. The appellant suc-
ceeded on a minor issue involving fourteen pounds while occupying
three days of the time of the High Court and increasing the costs of
one side alone to over two hundred pounds. Furthermore, the appellee
was sustained on by far the great majority of the points in contention,
and therefore no costs were allowed the prevailing party.
At the present time, appeal to the House of Lords is strictly
regulated, and leave to appeal must be obtained from either the House
of Lords or the Court of Appeal. Such leave is often granted on
condition that the costs of both sides be paid by the appellant. 50
Far more rare are those instances where the appellate court
determines that the prevailing party should bear its own costs inasmuch
as its conduct justified the appellant's resort to the higher court.5
Furthermore, there have been a few instances where the courts have
noted that inasmuch as the questions involved were new, difficult,
and of general importance, the losing party should not be saddled with
the burden of paying the costs incurred by the successful party.5"
Undoubtedly, one of the important problems in any judicial system
is the regulation and distribution of the flow of cases. In a system
such as that existent in England, where some cases may be initiated
either in the county courts or the High Court of Justice, the power
over costs may be utilized quite effectively to channel cases into the
less congested county courts. This is of great benefit to the litigant
of modest means, for not only are court fees smaller, but costs generally
are lower in the county courts.
47. Accord, Chard v. Jervis, 9 Q.B.D. 178 (1882).
48. 82 L.J.K.B. 340 (1913).
49. [1926] 2 K.B. 37.
50. Re Ashton's Estate, 158 L.T.R. 441 (1938); Re Drake's Settlement, 157
L.T.R. 559 (1937).
51. Paterson v. St. Andrews Provost, 6 App. Cas. 833 (1881).
52. In re Mersey Ry. Co., 37 Ch. D. 610 (1888); Ex parte Walton, 17 Ch. D.
746 (1881). The discretion to vary from the general rule as to costs has also been
exercised in cases where the law was changed while the appeal was pending from thejudgment below. Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 3 K.B. 532.
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Pursuant to the County Courts Act of 1959, 53 a county court
has jurisdiction, subject to some limitations, to hear and determine
any action founded upon contract or tort when the amount in issue is
not more than four hundred pounds. In an effort to encourage resort
to the county court in lieu of an action in the High Court, the same
act provides as follows:
Where an action founded on contract or tort is commenced in
the High Court which could have been commenced in the County
Court and the action is not referred for trial to an official referee,
then . . . the plaintiff (a) if he recovers a sum less than three
hundred pounds, shall not be entitled to any more costs of the
action than those to which he would have been entitled if the
action had been brought in the County Court; and (b) if he
recovers a sum less than seventy-five pounds, shall not be entitled
to any costs of the action ....
The section quite obviously implements the desire of the legislature
that cases involving lesser amounts be handled with dispatch. In order
to prevent injustice arising out of the application of the section, any
High Court judge may grant an exception to its terms if he finds
that there was reasonable ground for supposing that the amount
recoverable under plaintiff's claim would be in excess of the jurisdic-
tional limit of the county courts, namely four hundred pounds.5
When an action is remitted to a county court, it is the usual
practice to leave the costs to the county court judge's discretion. He
may be of the opinion that the case ought never to have been com-
menced in the High Court, marking his disapproval of the plaintiff's
action in his order as to costs. Where the action could not normally
have been commenced in a county court (for example an action for
defamation) it is obvious that he must award costs on the High Court
scale in respect to all proceedings taking place prior to remission
to the county court.58
The Evershed Committee took especial note of the effectiveness
of utilizing costs to deter small claimants from suing in the High
Court. A number of its recommendations were embodied in the new
County Courts Bill. 7 In discussing the bill in the House of Lords,
Lord Kilmuir, L.C., explained that its general aims were to make
justice more speedy, less expensive, but no less just.
In order to accomplish these purposes, the bill provided for an
increase in county court jurisdiction from two to four hundred pounds,
53. 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 22.
54. 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 22 § 47.
55. Id. at § 47(3).
56. 1 ANNUAL PRAC'rICS 1852 (Diamond ed. 1962).
57. County Courts Act 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 22.
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a small increase in the county court judiciary, and an extension of
legal aid to actions in the county courts. It has been estimated that
although a case can be heard in the county courts within six weeks of
issuance of summons, there is infrequently as long as a year's delay in
the High Court. Although generalizations as to costs may often be
misleading, the Evershed Committee estimated that in personal injury
actions costs run two hundred and fifty percent higher in the High
Court. This substantial difference is accounted for by larger counsel's
and solicitor's fees, increased allowances for expert witnesses, and
stenographic assistance. Although justice is a rather intangible quality,
the number of reversals or varied decisions of the county courts
compare favorably with the record of the High Court.18
One final group of cases deserves attention. It includes the
vexatious prosecutions brought by litigious parties - actions which
are often of little social or economic merit. No one denies the right of
the plaintiffs to prevail; however, under the present state of the law,
the right to recover costs is often withheld.
A most interesting example of the use of the discretion to deny
costs is the case of Gulbenkian v. British Broadcasting Corp.9 Nuban
Gulbenkian, the wealthy and picturesque son of the fabulously wealthy
oil financier, sued the BBC for breach of contract, charging that they
had failed to supply him with a telerecording of an interview he had
granted them. BBC would not give him the recording because it con-
tained defamatory matter which had been deleted from the broadcast
version. Gulbenkian had delivered the invective against the Gulbenkian
Foundation, founded by his late father, and the manner in which the
Foundation handled the funds at its disposal. Justice Glyn-Jones found
that there had been a breach of contract, but that due to the substantial
risk of an action for defamation by the Foundation trustees, it would
be undesirable to encourage further dissemination of the defamatory
matter. Accordingly, he awarded Gulbenkian a nominal two pounds
and directed him to pay the court costs, which were estimated to have
amounted to approximately forty thousand dollars.60
The breach of promise action involved in Gamble v. Sales6 was
equally farcical in result. The defendant, a pensioner in a veteran's
hospital, had agreed to marry the plaintiff before leaving for military
service. He was subsequently injured and refused to conclude the
58. In a typical year the Court of Appeal heard 581 appeals from the High Court
and revised or varied decisions in 173; it also heard 207 appeals from the County
Courts and reversed or varied thirty-eight. The Law's Delay, THE ECONOMIST,
May 28, 1955, p. 747.
59. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1962, p. 7, cols. 1 & 3.
60. Accord, Anglo-Cyprian Trade Agencies, Ltd. v. Paphos Wine Indus. Ltd.,[1951] 1 All E.R. 873 (K.B. 1951).
61. 36 T.L.R. 427 (1920).
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marriage. Although there were few, if any, prospects of satisfying a
judgment, the plaintiff brought the action and the defendant's plea,
that he was entirely unfit to marry, was not made out. The court
could not find that the evidence sustained his plea that marriage would
be dangerous to his life or disastrous to the state by the begetting of
idiot children. Nonetheless, the judge felt that actions which are of
only dubious advantage to the plaintiff should be discouraged and
therefore denied plaintiff her costs.
Perhaps a more common occurrence is the suit for nominal
infringement of a trademark. American Tobacco Co. v. Guest" in-
volved a retail trader who innocently purchased a small quantity of
cigarettes which turned out to be an infringement of plaintiff's trade-
mark. The court acknowledged that the plaintiff was entitled to an
injunction, but felt it was not its duty to saddle the defendants with
costs in such a case. He thought that this type of action was to be,
discouraged, for the party who placed the spurious goods on the market
was the real culprit deserving prosecution, not an "innocent" retailer.
Not only have prevailing plaintiffs been denied costs, but un-
successful plaintiffs have, on occasion, been saved from paying the
defendant's expenses. In the case of Borthwick v. The Evening Post,8 3
an old established newspaper, The Morning Post, sued to enjoin the
use of a similar name, The Evening Post, by the defendant newspaper.
The Court of Appeals held that although the new name might be calcu-
lated to deceive the public, there was no probability of injury to the
plaintiff. The injunction was denied, but due to the nature of the decep-
tion attempted by defendant, no costs were awarded against plaintiff.
It is in the area of unfair tactics and burdensome conduct that
the court's discretion as to costs is most effectively employed. For
example, where a defendant, who has a good defense by statute, such
as the statute of limitations, misleads his opponent into supposing that
he will not utilize the defense, the court may well deprive the defendant
of his costs.64 The extraordinary case of Parkinson v. College of
Ambulance, Ltd. & Harrison" is perhaps the clearest illustration of
this exercise of judicial power to prevent oppressive acts by a party
defendant. Parkinson entered into an illegal contract with Harrison,
agent of the ambulance society, who promised that he would arrange
for the grant to Parkinson of a knighthood if he made a substantial
donation to the society. After contributing three thousand pounds and
failing to receive the title, Parkinson sued for the return of the dona-
62. [1892] 1 Ch. 630.
63. 37 Ch. D. 449 (1888).
64. In re Speight, 13 Q.B.D. 42 (1884); In re Blyth & Young, 13 Ch. D.
416 (1880).
65. [19251 2 K.B. 1.
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tion. The court was clear that he could not prevail, but denied
Harrison his costs inasmuch as he "increased the costs of the litigation
by denying the fraud, and having a long cross-examination adminis-
tered to the plaintiff, and has not gone into the witness box or called
any witnesses to meet it." 6 In summation, the court characterized
Harrison's actions as oppressive.
Where both parties take unreasonable, extreme positions, and
therefore unduly exacerbate the litigation, the courts deny costs to
either side without hesitation." They also do so where one or both
of the parties obstinately insists on a vindication of rights by expensive
means when inexpensive resolution of the dispute is possible. Such
was the case in Young v. Thomas where an action was brought for
a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to an estate in fee simple
to an undivided moiety of an undivided sixth part of certain heredita-
ments. Four other actions were brought, for similar declarations,
against the same and other defendants as to other undivided shares of
the same hereditaments. It appeared that none of the shares claimed
was valued at more than fifteen pounds and four of them were valued
at less than ten pounds each. Defendants failed to put in a statement
of defense and judgment went for the plaintiffs. However, Justice
Kekewich "being of the opinion that so many actions for such small
amounts were unnecessary and oppressive, and not being convinced
that the defendants would not have acceded to the plaintiff's demands
without litigation, if properly applied to, refused any of the plaintiffs
their costs up to the hearing."69
Few would be so bold as to suggest that the adoption of the
English costs system is the solution to all the problems that beset our
judicial system. Certainly the relative efficiency of the administration
of justice in England is due to a number of factors, only one of which
is the system of costs.
However, as an increasing amount of attention is paid to measures
for procedural reform, thoughtful consideration should be given to the
English practice for it has the merit of efficiency. One potential point
of criticism deserves special attention. Bearing in mind the uncertainty
of many points of. law, some reviewers have felt that it is particularly
iniquitous to saddle the losing party with the still greater burden of
costs. 7 0 However, as Professor Gower has so aptly stated, "[U]nder
66. Id. at 17.
67. Pettey v. Parsons, [1914] 2 Ch. 653.
68. [18921 2 Ch. 134.
69. Costs were also denied the successful party in Diamantide v. Grosvenor Sec.,[1937] 1 All E.R. 703, inasmuch as undue delay resulted from the presentation of
irrelevant evidence. Accord, Ellis v. Leader, 22 T.L.R. 574 (1906).
70. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALn L.J. 849 (1929); Loesch, Reducing the Cost ofJustice, 22 NAT'L MUNIC. Rnv. 427 (1933) : Lyman, Our Obsolete System of Taxable
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our Common Law it has always been the case that the individual litigant
is made to pay for the clarification of the law for the benefit of the
general public."'"
Although this result is axiomatic under our common law system,
it, standing alone, hardly justifies an increase in the expense of the
unsuccessful party. Other factors, however, lend substance to the argu-
ment in favor of a meaningful system of costs. Certainly, weight must
be given to the desire of a successful party to be made whole by the
recovery, and the salutary effect of costs on judicial congestion can
scarcely be ignored. In our earnest efforts to avoid something akin
to the costs system, we have perpetrated an injustice of a far greater
order; namely, deprived many of our citizens of a forum for a speedy
resolution of their judicial controversies. As Mr. Justice Jackson
summed it up shortly before his death: "Delayed justice has become
little less than scandalous." 2
Costs, 25 CONN. B.J. 148 (1951) ; McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of
Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. Rpv. 619 (1931); Williamson,
Costs, 7 Mo. B.J. 63 (1936); Note, Problems in Allowance of Attorney's Fees in
America, 21 VA. L. Rzv. 920 (1935) ; 44 ILL. L. Rpv. 507 (1949).
71. Gower, The Costs of Litigation, 17 MOB. L. Rxv. 1, 13 (1954).
72. 41 A.B.A.J. 336 (1955).
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